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In the middle of a scalding hot October afternoon, I found myself waiting at the Mombasa 
Kadhi’s Court for the fifth time. Frustrated with my prior failure to meet the Kadhi and gain his 
permission to research at the court, I waited alongside a cross section of the Muslim community 
of Mombasa all attempting to meet with the Kadhi. Despite frustrations with the red tape 
surrounding the Kadhi’s court, acting as a barrier between me and all of the information I 
believed to be pertinent to my research, I realized that my research had already begun.  
A number of aggravated people around me began to strike up conversations, half due to 
frustrations with the Kadhi, and half due to the group curiosity surrounding the “mzungu” 
wearing a hijab. The court opened a standard fifteen minutes late, and the Kadhi’s staff informed 
me to try again in the morning. Apparently, the Kadhi had not returned to court for the afternoon. 
Disappointed at leaving the court yet again, unsuccessfully, my attention was drawn to a man 
making his way to the court. He was old and bedraggled, pushing himself upright from a 
makeshift wheelchair/ tricycle contraption, while simultaneously trying to prop himself on a 
single crutch. He struggled on to his only leg and began to make his way slowly to the large steps 
that ascended to the Kadhi’s court, only to be told that the Kadhi was not there and he should try 
again tomorrow. I wondered how many strenuous journeys this man would make up the stairs 
before his matter was solved with the Kadhi, or he gave up.  
When I reflect on an image that most clearly epitomizes my research on the Mombasa 
Kadhi’s Court, I continuously return to this man on his single leg and tattered clothes making the 
pilgrimage to court day after day. He represents my research on the Kadhi’s court, because he 
symbolizes the challenge and promise of the Kadhi’s court within contemporary Kenyan society. 
In particular, it reflects the Kadhi’s court as a site of struggle and contestation, where Kenyan 
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Muslims attempt to maintain a court that upholds Sharia law while simultaneously participating 





















Kenyan Kadhis’ Courts have a long standing relationship with Kenyan secular law, 
dating back to the arrival of the Imperial British East African Company in 1887 (Jeppie, 273).  
The company received a concession of 10 miles along the East African coastline from the 
Sultanate of Zanzibar where it was given full jurisdiction to enact new laws and create Courts of 
Justice (Jeppie, 274). Between 1897 and 1899 agreements were made between the Sultan and the 
Company that formally gave the Company rights to administration in parts of the Sultan’s land, 
as long as it was governed under Islamic Law (Jeppie, 274). This meant that Non-Muslim white 
British men were given the authority to enforce and decide legal matters from criminal matters 
but also Islamic family law. Acting as de-facto Kadhis, many of the Company officers had 
trouble enforcing some matters of Muslim law, as they felt their rulings should not just enforce 
legal standards, but also be an icon of Western Civilization’s superiority and consistent with 
Judeo-Christian morality. (Jeppie, 275). This issue is commonly referred to in colonialism as the 
repugnancy clause. In this case, the officers found it repugnant that a Muslim woman could be 
legally forced to return to a husband she had left, or Muslim beliefs on guardianship and custody 
of children challenged their Anglican ideals on what was in the best interest of a child (Jeppie, 
275). The British government bought out the Imperial British East African Company in 1897, 
and took the helm of the Sultanate’s land concessions (Jeppie, 277). This period marks the shift 
from independent and hegemonic Kadhi’s courts in East Africa to their union with a system 
based around non-Muslim law. This transition marked the beginning of a new legal pluralism as 
British common law derived East African secular law was welded with systems of customary 
and religious law. 
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The existing climate of legal pluralism in Kenya can be greatly attributed to the British 
Colonial policy of indirect rule. Under Indirect rule, the British emphasized a need to establish 
Native Courts where British powers were in theory limited to oversight and supervision, In 
practice, the policy of indirect rule gradually altered the legal power structure away from 
Religious and Customary law courts (Jeppie, 280). Under this system the British established 
several court systems, including the High Court and district courts in the secular side, and native 
courts that included the Kadhi’s Court and the Court of Local Chiefs (Jeppie, 282). The architect 
of British East African indirect rule, Arthur Hardinge established jurisdiction of Kadhis’ Courts 
in every district along the coast, confining Islamic law to only matters of personal status (Jeppie, 
282). The matters of personal status, or Islamic family law, consist of matters of marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance. Second, Hardinge created the position of a Chief Kadhi to be 
responsible for overseeing all Kadhi’s Courts within British jurisdiction, and handling matters of 
appeals, and then secular positions as administrative magistrates that could claim jurisdiction in 
Muslim personal law (Jeppie, 280). These changes have lasted within the Kadhis’ Courts through 
the reign of colonialism and into post independent Kenya, with the same standards of jurisdiction 
being renewed and applied through the Constitution of Kenya, and now the New Constitution of 
Kenya. After the Magistrates Act in 1967, the Secular Courts and Kadhis’ Courts were fully 
integrated, and while keeping the position of the Chief Kadhi, the process of appeals was sent 
through the High Court (Jeppie, 287). 
Currently there has been a large amount of controversy surrounding the Kadhi’s Court, 
due to the induction of the New Constitution. Many people around Kenya feel that it was not 
right to give the Kadhi’s Court legal jurisdiction in the constitution, but rather all Kenyan’s 
should use the same legal system and body of laws. However, with a Muslim population of over 
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4 million within Kenya, a large debate erupted. In the end the New Constitution was passed with 
a special section setting aside jurisdiction for the Kadhi’s Courts, so that Muslims can adhere to 
Sharia principles, and use the Kadhis’ courts to make personal claims that are submerged in 
family law. The Kadhi’s Court is officially given jurisdiction as seen fit by the Kenyan 
Parliament, and any matters decided in the Kadhis’ Courts can be appealed in the Kenyan High 
Court, so that secular legal systems always rank supreme, at least in technical language (New 
Constitution). This was a political move to help ease over tensions between those in favor of the 
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II.  Statement of the Problem 
1. The Kenyan Kadhi’s Court is overcrowded and underfunded, severely limiting its ability 
to effectively provide an alternate arena for dispute resolution. 
2.   The role of religious law in a secular country is still being contested and disputed in 
Kenyan legal arenas, most recently exemplified in the struggles over ratification of the 
new Kenyan Constitution. 
3. The Kadhi’s Court faces jurisdictional boundaries in that the limits of the Kadhi’s 
jurisdiction are continuously shifted by the Kenyan parliament and constitutional drafts, 



















1. To gain an accurate understanding of the process and system of the Kenyan Kadhi’s 
court, as well as the Shafi fiqh used in the Court.  
2. To understand the relationship between the Kadhi’s Court and the new legal landscape in 
Kenya.  
3. To understand both sides of the debate on whether or not to keep the Kadhi’s Court in the 
new Kenyan Constitution, and provide pros and cons for the decision to give the Kadhi’s 
Court jurisdiction over Muslim family law. 
4. To understand legal pluralism in the Kenyan context, and the practicalities and 
impracticalities of the simultaneous practice of Customary, Secular, and Religious Law in 
Kenyan Legal systems. 
5. To make suggestions for solutions to the aforementioned problems of the Kadhi’s Court, 











My primary research was conducted throughout the month of November, 2010, with some 
prior academic literature based preparation, and prior observations and visits to the Mombasa 
Kadhi’s Court, and civil trials in the Mombasa High Court. The bulk of my research falls into 
three categories: legal, archival, and ethnographic research. The main topics I researched 
consisted of understanding the inner workings and process of Kenyan Kadhis’ Courts, 
understanding how the Court fits into the larger Kenyan legal arena, the full jurisdiction of the 
Court, the gendered dynamics of Court rulings, and the arguments surrounding the New 
Constitution Kadhi’s Court controversy. Along the way I was also able to add new topics to my 
research, such as the transnational nature of the Court, the impacts of being a multilingual legal 
process, and the realistic struggles surrounding costs, funding, and bureaucratic difficulties, 
including differing understandings and standards of professional norms.  
Legal: I conducted legal research in not only the Mombasa Kadhi’s Court, but also the 
Mombasa High Court. In both venues I was able to observe hearings and trials, as well as 
conduct interviews with the Chief Magistrate of the Mombasa High Court, and the Kadhi of the 
Mombasa Kadhi’s Court. By not limiting research to the Kadhi’s Court, I was able to get an 
effective comparative perspective and deepen my understanding of the distinctions of Kadhis’ 
Courts from the secular legal system. By witnessing the process of various disputes and conflict 
resolution within the Kadhi’s Open Court, I was able to assess and analyze the hegemonic power 
structure of the Kadhi’s Court, while it maintains a technically subordinate position in the 
Kenyan legal system.  
Funderburk 
SIT Kenya: Swahili Islam 
12 
 
I further conducted legal research with academic writings on Kenyan Kadhis’ Courts and 
Muslim Law. My primary sources include, but are not limited to, Kassim and Vianello (eds.), 
Servants of the Sharia; Hirsch, Pronouncing and Persevering; Tucker, In the House of the Law; 
Rashid Muslim Law; Wadud, Qur’an and Woman. My understanding was that the Kadhi’s Court 
practiced the Shafi fiqh; I have come to understand the process as a much more generalized 
application of Sharia. I used the various aforementioned texts as well as observations and 
interviews to assess this application of Islamic Law. I also performed an in depth analysis of the 
New Constitution, and the preceding Wako Draft to analyze the constitutional jurisdiction of the 
Courts, as well as the controversy surrounding the inclusion of a religious court system in a 
secular legal system.  
Archival: My archival research consisted of analyzing Kadhis’ Court records, documents, 
and cases. In the court records I was able to see the forms of reasoning used in the Court’s 
handling of disputes, as well as the thought processes that lead to the Kadhi’s final judgments. In 
addition, the documents also provided me with a sense of the general kinds of disputes that 
appear before the Kadhi, as well as the basic Sharia based logic that unbiasedly is applied to the 
majority of cases. Further archival research consisted of internet accessed newspaper archives 
documenting arguments surrounding the jurisdiction and legality of the Kadhis’ Court from such 
sources as the Daily Nation and the Standard. One notable archive was the Daily Nation’s article 
“Kenyan AG to appeal kadhi courts ruling,” from May 26
th, 
2010 in which a three judge bench 
declared the inclusion of the Kadhis’ Court in the New Constitution as unconstitutional. By 
accessing these archives through the internet I was also able to gather Daily Nation reader 
comments, and notably this article alone received 29,000 “likes” in favor of the three judges’ 
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ruling. This mode of archival research was able to highlight the heightened level of controversy 
surrounding the Kadhis’ Courts in Kenyan society.  
Ethnographic: My ethnographic research consisted of participant observation, structured and 
unstructured interviews, ethnographies pertaining to the Courts, as well as the occasional 
eavesdropping insight. I performed participant observation in not only the Kadhi’s Open Court 
and Mombasa High Court proceedings, but also in the process of gaining entry into the Court, 
and watching and being one of countless throngs of people volleying in line for their turn to enter 
the Court Clerk’s office for various forms of assistance that are mandatory before ever reaching a 
chance at a hearing. This research helped further my comprehension and awareness of both the 
procedures of the court and the aspirations and frustrations of the applicants who utilize the 
Kadhi’s Court. The informal sector of my research has proved invaluable in order to narrowly 
focus my research on important issues within Muslim family law that people are being frustrated 
with here and now. During the course of document research, I have had the chance to discuss 
issues pertaining to the court with various officers and staff of the court. As the staff consists of 
only six people, I am handling their opinions and interviews differently from the rest of my 
interview sample, to protect their work and community interests in a more strenuous manner than 
other interviews. I will mostly refer to impressions that I got while in the court, rather than citing 
an individual’s concerns from within the Kadhi’s Court staff. In opposition, in structured 
interviews I gained permission to cite, but most interviewees will remain under aliases.  
Lastly, I want to address frustrations and limitations faced in the process of research, 
ranging from access to the Kadhi, gender limitations, language limitations, archival research 
barriers, and the standard struggles of bureaucracy. I found my first week of research 
excruciatingly difficult, as the Kadhi was not at the court any of the 6 times I tried to find him 
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during court hours. Until the Kadhi met with me and granted permission for me to research, I 
was not allowed access to any court information. During this phase of research I coined the term 
“buibui brigade” to describe the expert staff of women in the Kadhi’s Court who gracefully 
assisted the Kadhi, and handled his reputation to the countless frustrated people vying for their 
day in court, myself included. On one of my more frustrating days trying to access the Kadhi, a 
member of the “buibui brigade” told me to try again the next morning at 8:30 am. I pushed to try 
and schedule an appointment, or leave my name and phone number, so that if all else failed at 
least the Kadhi would know that someone was trying desperately to reach him, I was then told 
this was not necessary. I asked if she knew the Kadhi would be there the next day for sure, and 
the response was “the Kadhi is only human, we can’t expect more from him than that.” 
Once I had been granted access by the Kadhi, I faced another issue, understanding the open 
court. I found it very difficult to hear in the open court, whether English or Kiswahili were being 
used, which greatly affected my ability to understand court proceedings. Further, I struggled to 
understand many of the women’s testimonies as not only did they use Kiswahili, they also spoke 
drastically more quietly than men in court proceedings. Further, in trying to read through old 
court cases, I discovered the Mombasa Kadhi has the world’s worst handwriting, and that many 
of his judgments were indecipherable not only to myself, but his staff as well. All of these 
limited my ability to fully delve into the ways in which the Kadhi makes decisions, and therefore 
limited my knowledge of the full extent of the application of Islamic law in Mombasa Kadhi’s 
courts. 
Lastly, I faced some issues in research, because of the gender dynamics of access, however 
with these limitations also came some benefits. I found that my status as a woman in Kadhi’s 
court research was personally challenging, but also transformed my interactions. To show respect 
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to the Kadhi and those surrounding the court I choose to dress differently than normal. My daily 
wardrobe consisted of ankle length skirts, long sleeved button down shirts, and a hijab. By 
covering I was able gain more access to interviews and resources, because many people very 
clearly appreciated that I covered. My status as a covered woman also encouraged other women 
to talk to me, often times seeking me out in conversation as they waited next to me for the court 
to open. However, I noticed that women are far more shy around the Kadhi’s court, and hard to 
approach when wearing the more severely covering buibuis. At the same time, my status as a 
woman also dictated that I sit among other women in open court, which happened to be the 
furthest benches from the Kadhi, therefore limiting my ability to hear and understand. Also, I 
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V.  Literature Review 
A. The Proposed Constitution of Kenya, 6th May, 2010 (Approved Aug 4th 2010) 
As a starting point in my research on the Kenyan Kadhis Courts, I examined The Proposed 
Constitution of Kenya that was approved by public referendum August 4
th
 2010, and 
subsequently ratified by the Kenyan Parliament. Articles 159 through 173 govern judicial 
authority, organization, and funding. Article 159(2) states that “in exercising judicial authority, 
the courts and tribunals shall be guided by the following principles- (c) alternative forms of 
dispute resolution including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration, and traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms shall be promoted, subject to clause (3).” Clause (3) goes on to state 
“traditional dispute resolution mechanisms shall not be used in a way that- (a) contravenes the 
Bill of Rights; (b) is repugnant to justice and morality or results in outcomes that are repugnant 
to justice or morality; or (c) is inconsistent with this Constitution or any written law.” Under 
section 162, System of Courts, the establishment of subordinate courts is under Article 169 or by 
Parliament in accordance with Article 169. Subordinate Courts are defined by the constitution as 
the Magistrates courts, the Kadhis’ courts, the Courts Martial, and “any other court or local 
tribunal as may be established by an Act of Parliament, other than the courts established as 
required by Article 162(2). Further in Article 169(2) the constitution sets aside the authority of 
Parliament to enact legislation that sets the jurisdiction, functions, and power of the subordinate 
courts. Lastly, Article 170 explicitly defines the role of Kadhi’s courts in Kenya.  
170. (1) There shall be a Chief Kadhi and such number, being not fewer than three, of 
other Kadhis as may be prescribed under an Act of Parliament. (2) A person shall not be 
qualified to be appointed to hold or act in the office of Kadhi unless the person- (a) 
professes the Muslim religion; and (b) possesses such knowledge of the Muslim law 
applicable to any sects of Muslims as qualifies the person, in the opinion of the Judicial 
Service Commission. To hold a Kadhi’s court. (3) Parliament shall establish Kadhis’ 
courts, each of which shall have the jurisdiction and powers conferred on it by legislation, 
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subject to clause (5). (4) The Chief Kadhi and the other Kadhis, or the Chief Kadhi and 
such of the other Kadhis (not being fewer than three in number) as may be prescribed 
under an Act of Parliament, shall each be empowered to hold a Kadhi’s court having 
jurisdiction within Kenya. (5) The jurisdiction of a Kadhis’ court shall be limited to the 
determination of questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, divorce or 
inheritance in proceeding in which all the parties profess the Muslim religion and submit 
to the jurisdiction of the Kadhi’s courts.  
The New Constitution highlights the inherited colonial legacy in regards to the 
jurisdiction and organization of the Kadhis’ courts. It is interesting how the 2010 draft of the 
constitution still retains the legacy of the repugnancy clause. The vagueness of the concept of 
“repugnancy” was used, within the colonial context, to uphold a particularly Christian view of 
morality when governing non-Christian populations. The current constitution, in retaining this 
language of repugnancy, similarly shows the particularistic impulses within purportedly 
universal and unbiased secular law. In the Kenyan case, the new constitution’s repugnancy 
clause can thus be read as holding onto the colonial legacy of a Christianity derived secular legal 
system and it’s fear of giving Islamic based religious law full jurisdiction in its respective field. 
Other illustrations of this enduring colonial legacy in the New Constitution can be seen through 
the limited jurisdiction of the Kadhis’ courts, as well as the secular legal system’s ultimate 
hierarchy over all subordinate courts. The basic establishment of the Kadhi’s court by Arthur 
Hardinge has had a long lasting durable legacy.  
B. Kenya Gazette Supplement, 2005 
The Proposed New Constitution of Kenya (Wako Draft) 
The Wako Draft was a proposed constitution that was defeated in it’s 2006 public 
referendum. One of the critiques was that the draft did not legitimately limit the power of the 
presidency. Among other critiques, the draft was argued by some to be pro abortion, and 
frustrations surrounded the treatment of religious and customary law courts. In Article 178(3) the 
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draft states that the law, courts, and tribunals would be guided by various principles, including 
“reconciliation, mediation and arbitration between parties, and the use of traditional courts, 
where appropriate, shall be promoted.”  
Article 195 specifically addressed religious courts, unlike the current Constitution which 
specifically addresses Kadhis’ courts. 
195.(1) There are established Christian courts, Kadhi’s courts and Hindu courts. 
 (2) Parliament may, by legislation, establish other religious courts. 
(3) Christian courts, Kadhi’s courts, Hindu courts, and other religious courts shall 
respectively- 
(a) consist of Chief presiding officers, Chief Kadhi and such number of 
other presiding officers or Kadhis, all of whom profess the respective 
religious faith; and  
(b) be organized and administered, as may be prescribed by the respective 
Act of Parliament 
(4) Christian courts, Kadhi’s courts, Hindu courts and other religious courts shall 
have jurisdiction to determine questions of their religious laws relating to personal 
status, marriage, divorce and matters consequential to divorce, inheritance and 
succession in proceedings in which all the parties profess the respective faith, as 
may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament. 
The above section of the Wako Draft was a political attempt at pacifying any dissent of 
the Kadhis’ courts. It is invalid because Kenya does not have any established Christian or 
Hindu court systems. Also, within Christian and Hindu belief systems, the notion of 
Religious law is a mistranslation, and they are amendable to a separation of Church and 
State, as evident by a Biblical injunction “Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and give to God 
what is God’s.” 
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C. In the House of the Law 
By: Judith Tucker 
To further my basic understanding of Islamic Law, and the role played by fatwas in an 
Islamic community I used Judith Tucker’s In the House of the Law. The fatwas Tucker presents 
show a clear depiction of the importance of gender in Ottoman Syria and Palestine, while also 
presenting the basics of Islamic gender roles as “a man was to provide; a woman was to 
consume. A man was to decide; a woman was to obey” (Tucker 66). One distinctly gendered 
area is that of childrearing. In fatwas regarding parenthood, children need more paternal care in 
the later stages of childhood, and maternal in the earliest stages. Under Sharia law there are four 
stages of childhood before one reaches full adulthood, a child in the womb is considered to be in 
the first stage of childhood. While mothers are not punishable for unintentional miscarriage, the 
loss of an unborn child can be considered murder on the mother’s part if her actions resulted in 
the loss of the fetus. Throughout the early stages of childhood until bulugh, or puberty, mothers 
play a large role as caregivers. As children begin to gain the skills needed to fully care for 
themselves the roll of the father increases, until bulugh when the parental importance shifts 
dominantly to the father. I witnessed this theory in practice in the Mombasa Kadhi’s Court in 
many case files of custody between two divorced parents, often mother’s received custody until 
the child reached puberty, and fathers received custody for post puberty aged children. 
Other important elements of In the House of the Law were in understanding the role of legal 
thinkers, muftis, and fatwas in Islamic Law. The task of an Islamic legal thinker is to not only 
distinguish the male from the female, but also to elaborate on distinctly gendered rights, many of 
which privilege men, but some of which work to temper male dominance (Tucker 66). This 
resource proved invaluable in understanding many judgments issued by the Mombasa Kadhi, and 
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the basic principles that governed them. Tucker highlights fatwas that revolve around gender and 
law, which was crucial in my understanding of the Kadhis courts, because Islamic family law is 
always gendered.  
D. Pronouncing and Persevering: Gender and the Discourses of Disputing in an African 
Islamic Court 
By: Susan Hirsch 
Pronouncing and Persevering was the literary starting point in my research, and is integral as 
a way to understand dispute in the Kadhis’ courts as gendered legal discourse. Hirsch sheds light 
on the gendered tailoring of narratives in the public space of a court testimony, as a result of both 
Swahili and Islamic cultural norms.  
 Hirsch outlines the processes of economic decline and political marginalization among the 
Swahili, and the use of Swahili women as a way to police the status of Swahili families, and keep 
a hierarchical class structure within the Swahili. She analyzes representation among the Swahili 
through tools like the “buibui” and how the varied forms of veiling can shed light on a woman’s 
family’s status and values, while acknowledging the contemporary shifts in veiling. For example 
the Swahili use of the hijab style of veiling can both mark women’s entrance into formal 
economic production, but despite leaving the face uncovered like other buibui styles, it is often 
considered a higher class veiling, as it keeps the woman modestly covered, while acknowledging 
the family to which she belongs by leaving the face visible.  
One of the main ideas presented by Hirsch, and critical to my research is the argument of 
dispute as a performance. Hirsch argues that in the context of the Kadhis’ courts men and women 
not only tailor their narratives along gendered lines, but also enact a performance that edits to 
make the narrative the least disturbing to the family reputation. The process of dispute has 
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already gone through various stages by the time it has metastasized to the point of court 
interference. The image of the Swahili family is the pronouncing husband and the persevering 
wife, in relationships where couples are offered the advice when the wed, argue, and separate “to 
marry in a good way, and divorce in a good way.” In order to be granted a divorce they must 
present a narrative of suffering that also portrays themselves as persevering and positive assets to 
their families.   
Hirsch describes the recommended process of dispute resolution in which Conflict 
Resolution is held by men and their larger access to Islamic Law: First a man should talk with his 
wife, if no agreement results, he should refuse to have sex with her until she consents to work 
toward a resolution. If, after a short, specified period of time, this approach fails to lead to 
reconciliation, then the husband is permitted to use mild physical force. In local practice, beating 
one’s wife is condemned and the Koranic reference is interpreted as meaning “symbolic 
beating.” If this produces no result, the husband can take a formal oath of sexual continence 
lasting up to four months. If after the period of sexual abstinence the couple still has failed to 
reconcile, they should approach a third party for assistance. These procedures are understood as 
measures taken before one invokes legal discourse. Finally, if all efforts fail men are permitted to 
wield Islamic law and pronounce divorce. 
The overall point of Hirsch’s work is to emphasize how Muslim women use legal processes 
to transform Religious and cultural norms, that underpin their subordinate position within 
Swahili society. Although social conventions project women as persevering wives, who should 
suffer in silence, as opposed to their pronouncing husbands, some women none the less are able 
to circumvent these stereotypical roles to temper male power.  My only critique of Hirsch’s work 
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is that it dwells too much on the historical background of the work, rather than analyzing the 
court processes.  
 
E. Servants of the Sharia: The Civil Register of the Qadis’ Court of Brava 1893-1900 
By: Alessandra Vianello and Mohamed M. Kassim 
 Servants of the Sharia provided an excellent and in depth historical analysis of the history 
of Kadhis’ courts  in East Africa, especially pertaining to the interaction between the Courts 
and colonial governments. Unlike Kenya, in the Case of Brava, the colonial authority was the 
Italian government, and the Kadhis’ court register documents the period of transition from 
Sharia law based society to their subordination under the Italian government.  
 The register documents the handling of all legal matters, not just family law, including 
debt and inheritance. It chronicled the idea of the deed, or property title as it gained efficacy 
in the region in the region to a point where local Muslims preferred to take the deed as proof 
of ownership to colonial courts instead of going through the often cumbersome rules of 
evidence in order to determine title within Sharia. Many of the cases involved indebtness and 
inheritance, as issues regarding capital were well detailed and given high value. These case 
files included explicitly outlined payment schedules and exact amounts of debt, despite being 
unable to claim interest due to the principle of lariba under Sharia.  
 Vianello and Kassim paid particular interest on the gender dynamics of the court, in the 
ways in which disputes were gendered within the community. Women were able to stake a 
claim within this patriarchal system for issues like the dissolving of their marriages in the 
absence of adequate nafaqa. In order to receive favorable decisions women were increasingly 
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able to take up issues in Secular colonial courts, which provided an albeit limited form of 
forum shopping legal arenas.  
 While Servants of the Sharia provided excellent historical analysis of the history of 
Kadhis’ courts on the East African  coast, despite failing to connect to the contemporary 
existence of Religious law in the area, It also gives a tireless record of the various cases 
registered in the Kadhi’s Court in Brava, but would have been far more interesting with 
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VII. Analysis and Results 
A. Jurisdiction 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, jurisdiction is the practical authority granted to 
formally constituted legal body to make pronouncements on legal matters, and by amplification 
administer justice within a defined area of responsibility. Under the new constitution, Kadhi’s 
courts are given jurisdiction in matters of personal law, as long as the participating parties meet 
specific requirements. Personal law, also referred to as family law, is defined within the Kenyan 
legal system as matters pertaining to personal status, marriage, divorce, or inheritance. 
Jurisdiction over divorce also includes matters of dowry, alimony, and child custody. 
Requirements to fall under the Kadhi’s court jurisdiction are primarily that both parties identify 
themselves as Muslims, that the parties are of sound mind, and the issue has to be located in the 
Republic of Kenya, and more specifically in the specific jurisdictional area of the individual 
Kadhi’s court for which the issue is addressed. Given that the Kadhis’ courts are enshrined in the 
New Constitution, they are an official piece of the Kenyan judiciary, technically linked with the 
Kenyan High Court, and therefore able to summon and issue warrants for non-compliance with 
Kadhi judgments. It is important to stress that the Kadhi’s court has concurrent jurisdiction with 
other subordinate courts that deal with matters of civil law, so that in many ways the Kadhi’s 
court is a form of shopping for the best legal forum for your issue of personal law. According to 
one staff member within the court, many applicants to the court fail to realize that the Kadhi’s 
court falls within the Kenyan judiciary, and is not in itself a fully separate and autonomous legal 
system. In one conversation she expressed feelings that Muslims entered the court as if they 
owned it, and that they did not understand that it was an integral part of the Kenyan judiciary in 
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which they could opt to have their family matters treated in an Islamic way, while still adhering 
to the Kenyan penal code. 
Examples of the Kadhi’s jurisdiction can be found in a variety of cases I reviewed. The 
records for Civil Case A was the first time I ran across a Kadhi’s court Penal notice, which 
highlighted the authority granted under the Kadhi’s jurisdiction. The Penal Notice states that “ 
any party served with this order and who disobeys the same shall be guilty of contempt of court 
and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine or both fine and 
imprisonment.” This case not only displayed the power the Kadhi can exert on people in the 
court, but also highlighted the kinds of issues that can be addressed within the court. In this case, 
the plaintiff received custody and guardianship of his child without being divorced from his wife. 
The plaintiff did not want a divorce, but was concerned that his wife, a Tanzanian citizen, would 
take his child across the border, and out of the country. This particular case was perplexing, 
because in the Kadhi’s order no reference was made to Islamic law that may have been used in 
creating the judgment. Additionally, the mother had her parental rights revoked not only while 
married to the father, but also without being present in the court. It is interesting that custody and 
guardianship can be given to a sole parent, while legally the parents are a joint legal entity. In 
this way, I sense that the Kadhi’s court understanding of family law is in many ways fluid and 
lacks concrete definitional binding.  This is distinct from civil law, which treats parents of a child 
as a legal unit until the marriage is dissolved, therefore the products of that unit cannot be legally 
divided without divorce. 
In Civil Case E, I found a case that also exemplifies the Kadhi’s court jurisdiction, as it 
dealt with polygamy, which cannot legally exist as a union under Kenyan civil law, and is not 
recognized in the Kenyan Marriage Act. However, under the Kadhi’s Court’s jurisdiction, and as 
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found in Civil Case E of my research, issues of polygamous marriage and divorce can be 
addressed in the Kadhi’s Courts as legal unions. In Civil Case E the Kadhi granted a woman 
maintenance (alimony) payments, after she was divorced by a man to whom she was his second 
wife. In a civil case within the jurisdiction of a magistrate’s court, a woman who was a second 
wife would not be eligible for alimony payments, as she would not have legally been married to 
the man, and therefore the man would have no legal responsibilities towards her.  
Another important jurisdictional element to understand is that a Kadhi’s judgment can be 
appealed, through a process of filing an appeal in the Kenyan High Court. However, what many 
using the court fail to realize, is that once your case has been processed under the Kadhi’s Court 
jurisdiction, it will still be decided through Islamic law in the High Court Appeal. As judges and 
magistrates of the High Court lack Islamic law knowledge, they bring in a new Kadhi to advise 
on all Kadhi’s court appeals, so that the case will receive a second judgment that is not a civil 
judgment, but remains under Islamic law. However, the same process in reverse is different. In a 
situation where the appellant is not satisfied with the secular court system’s judgment, they can 
decide, based on their status as a Muslim, to re-file the case under the Kadhi’s court  and get a 
new judgment with a different system of law. My understanding of this process of appeals is 
from an interview with a staff member of the High Court, who works in the Mombasa Kadhi’s 
Court office. 
B. Kenya’s New Constitution 
With the recent adoption of the new Kenyan Constitution, it is important to discuss the 
making of this constitution, and the controversy involved in debates over the constitutionality of 
the Kadhis’ courts. The Kadhis’ courts were sanctioned by the new Constitution, but not without 
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vociferous debate as well as various attempts at compromise. The size of this debate alone was 
massive, with one news article published on the Daily Nation’s website receiving 29,000 votes 
against the Kadhis’ courts in an online poll (Judges ruled on Kadhi’s court). These large numbers 
attest to the sensitivity of this issue and the massive impact of this debate on Kenyan life. 
The main argument against the authority of the Kadhis’ courts as set forth in the constitution 
is that it creates an unfair division among Kenyans, due to the sanctioned use of separate courts. 
The basic idea is that all Kenyans should follow the same laws, and take up their problems in the 
same courts. This argument merely seeks to set up an idea of legal equality and homogeny 
throughout the country. Opponents of the Kadhis’ courts insist that these institutions unfairly 
privilege one particular community and exasperate the larger divide among Kenyans, who are 
notorious for their ethnic struggles. This argument is also being applied to other constitutional 
questions, such as the manner in which census data is collected, with many fearing the results of 
having people identified by ethnicity, kabila, or religion.  
The secondary argument against the Kadhis’ courts was that it was the first step towards the 
imposition of Sharia law on a national level, and that government funds were being used to favor 
one religion over others. This argument felt that ignoring the separation of church and state by 
giving jurisdiction and funds to the Kadhis’ courts would further Islamic agendas at the cost of 
the non Islamic majority of the nation. However, this argument fails to understand that the 
Kenyan Kadhis’ courts have a long history that is intertwined with British colonial participation, 
and have been in the constitution since 1963. Other opponents of the Kadhis’ courts argue that 
these courts are in violation of other constitutional principles, such as the freedom of religion, 
and equal protection under law. This argument believes the courts violate freedom of religion 
because favoring one religion automatically violates another religion; and that certain people 
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because of the nature of their beliefs will get special privilege to the institution. The main 
downfall of these other two arguments is that one community’s religious freedom is not 
inherently a violation of another community’s religious freedom, dismissing the notion of Kenya 
as a singular community and acknowledging the presence of 42 different kabilas, and countless 
belief systems. The notion that Kadhi’s courts violate the equal protection under the law ignores 
that the constitution does provide special protections for groups other than Muslims, including 
women, children, and people with disabilities. Muslims can also be argued as deserving 
protection under the law, as Kenyan Muslims can claim minority status. 
Prior to the promulgation of the new constitution, an earlier attempt at compromise and 
accommodating the Kadhi’s courts within the judicial framework is visible in the Constitution 
“Wako Draft” of 2005, which failed to be ratified. Article 195 of the draft established religious 
courts, as approved means of alternative dispute resolution, sanctioning Christian, Islamic, and 
Hindu courts. This article was an ineffective tool in easing the Kadhis’ court debate, because 
while it tried to acknowledge other predominant Kenyan religions, it failed to change anything. 
This is because Christian and Hindu courts do not exist in Kenya, and therefore it does not make 
sense to acknowledge Christian or Hindu law based courts, in the end the courts would have 
been a constitutional myth. Historically speaking, Christians and Hindus lack legal traditions that 
are separate from the state; therefore people who fall under these categories were able to take up 
all matters of personal law within secular court systems without directly affronting their religious 
beliefs. The other change is the Wako draft’s separation of traditional and religious courts, which 
is lumped together under “alternative forms of dispute” in the new constitution. While there is a 
large difference in customary and religious law in their application in Kenya, the move to include 
them in the same category within the new Constitution acts as broadening category for those who 
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do not fall under the Kadhis’ courts’ jurisdiction, to act as a buffer between Kadhis’ courts 
supporters and protestors.    
In 2008, the Kenyan parliament passed the Constitutional Review Act, which protected the 
constitutional reforms process from judicial review, unless on a referendum platform. This 
means that the formation of the constitution could only be changed by a national vote, in which 
all registered voters would have a voice. This move by parliament was to prevent last minute 
politically motivated tweaks to the constitution that would completely alter the balance of power 
set forth by the draft immediately preceding the referendum. 
In May 2010, during the build up to the new Constitution, a three judge bench of the High 
Court ruled, in a controversial decision, that the inclusion of the Kadhis’ courts in the judicial 
system violated the equal protection of religion clause of the Constitution, and thus was 
unconstitutional. The judges ruled that government financing of the Kadhis’ courts amounted to 
“segregation, and is sectarian, discriminatory, and unjust as against the applicants.”However, this 
decision was not upheld, because shortly after this ruling, the new Constitution was voted in by 
referendum. The High Court judges’ decision was in regards to the old constitution, and would 
have been valid had the new Constitution not passed by referendum. This move by the three 
High Court judges was thus purely political, and a move to publically align themselves with the 
bishops and clergy of Christian denominations throughout Kenya opposing the Kadhis’ courts 
inclusion in the New Constitution. One striking feature of the opposition of the Kadhis’ courts 
has been the widespread use of mass media, including the internet, to galvanize opposition in 
new and lesser explored arenas. Through the course of my research, I found people participating 
in Kadhis’ courts debates on the Daily Nation’s website, as well as the Standard, and even an 
anti-Kenyan Kadhis’ courts Facebook group. While the Facebook group only had approximately 
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850 members, one Daily Nation online poll had 29,000 votes against the Kadhis’ courts in the 
new Constitution. The main message of the internet participation has been fear mongering 
propaganda, encouraging a wide spread belief that Kadhis’ courts are a secret plot towards the  
Muslim domination of the world. 
Despite wide spread fear and arguments against the Kadhis’ courts, the August 4
th
 2010 
referendum ensured that Kenyan Kadhis’ courts would continue to be enshrined in the judiciary 
and provide an avenue for Kenyan Muslims to seek redress on issues of personal/family law 
from within an Islamic jurisprudential framework.  
C. Kadhi’s Court Power Structure 
 According to Kenya’s 2010 census, Kenya is home to 38.6 million people, and 4.3 million 
Muslims. To serve the family law issues of these 4.3 million Muslim citizens, Kenya has 17 
Kadhis. That is 253,000 people to every one Kadhi. In comparison the other 34.3 million 
Kenyans average one judge per 10,000 people (UNODC Kenyan Judiciary Report). These 17 
Kadhis’ are organized under the guidelines set forth in the new Constitution which required the 
Kadhis’ courts to have 1 Chief Kadhi, with at least 3 other Kadhis. All Kadhis must be Muslim, 
with knowledge of Muslim law in the opinion of the Judicial Service Commission (Constitution 
of Kenya, Articles 169-170). The result is a severely understaffed Kadhis’ courts system that is 
unintentionally hegemonic in its power structure, despite its status as a subordinate court within 
the Kenyan Judiciary. Each of the 17 Kadhis has his own court, divided into districts throughout 
Kenya. Depending on your location, and the location of your issue, there is a certain Kadhi with 
whom your case must be heard by. 
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 The Muslim populations of Mombasa, Kilifi, Mariakany, Voi, and Taveta are all in the 
Mombasa Kadhi’s Court district. Mombasa is the 2
nd
 biggest city in Kenya, with 60-70% of it’s 
population being Muslim (Daily Nation, Kenya Census Results). All of these people rely solely 
on the Mombasa Kadhi, Sheikh Twalib Bwana Mohamed, who has been the Mombasa Kadhi for 
15 years. Due to the organization of the Kadhis’ courts, Kadhi Twalib is solely responsible for 
the decisions regarding a large population and the court fails to have a strong system in place to 
temper the power wielded by the Kadhi.  
 The weaknesses in a system with this hegemonic structure can be most clearly seen in the 
appellate system of the court. If a decision made by the Kadhi is appealed, despite being filed in 
the High Court, it is re-decided by another of the 17 Kadhis under the assistance of a High Court 
judge, based off of the case file assembled by the 1
st
 Kadhi, and using Islamic not secular law. 
When the appeal is filed, the deciding Kadhi is notified, and his case file and decision is 
requested.  Given the small number of Kadhis, it is fair to assume a degree of uniformity in their 
decision-making styles, and the appeals process seems biased in favor of the deciding Kadhi. 
This fails to temper any one Kadhi’s power, because the fraternity of Kenyan Kadhis will 
support one another, and internalize any issues, leading to an impenetrable hegemonic power 
structure.  
 I argue that the appeals process in the Kadhi’s court is unable to temper the Kadhi’s power. 
There is no check on the Kadhi’s power, because even if his decisions are publically regarded as 
mediocre or inadequate, the system is not designed for an arena of dissent communication. 
Common sense tells us that it would be intimating to file an appeal for many patrons of the 
Kadhis courts, because of how the Kadhi’s power is publically portrayed. It is even more 
intimidating for those patrons who fully comprehend the process of appeals, because if there is 
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only one Kadhi who you affront by appealing his decision, what happens when you need to 
address another issue within the court? For example, if someone appealed a decision regarding 
their divorce proceedings, but later needed the Kadhi’s court for a matter of inheritance; will that 
person automatically receive an unbiased judgment from the Kadhi? 
 Problematic appeals processes are not limited to Kadhis’ courts in Kenya. This  is a deeply 
rooted problem that plagues the entire Kenyan judiciary. For example, I observed a rape trial 
appeal in the Kenyan High Court at Mombasa. In this case, a man had been found guilty of 
molesting and violating a minor, and received 20 years in prison based on the testimony of two 
primary witnesses. The High Court judge during judicial review did not call the witnesses to 
stand in order to testify, but simply accepted their testimonies without ever laying eyes on the 
witnesses. Neither did the judge offer solid legal reasoning for upholding the prior decision, and 
returned the man to his 20 year prison sentence without ever once acknowledging his presence in 
the court room, or allowing him to speak on his behalf. This hegemonic power of the judge, and 
clear judicial fraternal alliance is both a legacy of colonial common law tradition, but more 
importantly a practical result of an overcrowded and underfunded judiciary. The case in question 
was completed in less than five minutes and followed by a considerably longer case on rental 
dispute. Further, the court was trying such a large number of cases, the criminally accused 
defendants were being seated among the audience, with only two guards, and no visual 
identification differentiating accused from members of the public. Thus the problems of the 
Kadhis’ courts power structure can be seen as symptomatic of the broader problems within the 
Kenyan judiciary.  
D. Professionalism and Bureaucracy 
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There is a misconception among a number of proponents of the Kadhis’ courts that these 
sites of alternate dispute resolution offer a less bureaucratic forum for conflict resolution and are 
thus preferred to secular courts. In my research, I interviewed a long time Kenya resident, and 
graduate degree holding Muslim woman who informed me of how wonderful and infinitely 
preferable Kadhis’ courts were to secular courts. She held the opinion that the Kadhis’ court 
systems were very informal and easy to access, with an open door policy to any issues of 
conflict, not only formally filed complaints, but also as a form of counseling for those 
experiencing issues related to personal law. I refute this opinion based on my experience and 
research of the Mombasa Kadhi’s court. I reported to the Kadhis’ courts on seven occasions 
before gaining access to the Kadhi, each time being given another time to return in hopes that the 
Kadhi might actually show up to his court. I asked to leave my name and number, I asked to 
make an appointment, and I repeatedly asked if the Kadhis’ staff if he really would be there the 
next morning at the time I was given to return. I finally saw the Kadhi on my 8
th
 visit, and was 
able to speak with him for five minutes before his open court adjourned. I was lucky with my 
one week of attempts, I interviewed a man from London who had been trying to have his case 
heard by the Kadhi for over 2 weeks. Therefore, I argue that the Kadhi’s court is not the 
informal, easily accessed, and bureaucracy free setting that my Lamu interviewee mistakenly 
understands it to be.  
While attending to my research in the Mombasa Kadhi’s Court, I took a quick count of the 
amount of people at the Kadhi’s Court each time I arrived. Whether it was first thing in the 
morning, when the court opened at 8:30 am, or whether it was the opening of the court after 
lunch at 2:00 pm, I continually counted a minimum of 35 people volleying to be heard by the 
Kadhi’s Court staff, or waiting to their turn to testify in the Kadhi’s Open Court. The only 
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occasions I found less than 35 people waiting in the court were the afternoons around 3:00 pm on 
the days that the Kadhi had opted not to return to the court after his afternoon meal. When I 
enquired whether or not the Kadhi informed his office staff whether or not he would be at the 
court, I received a very tailored response, that pretty much told me that no they were not 
generally aware of where he was or why he had not returned, but that he is a very good Kadhi all 
the same. The “buibui brigade”, after all, were experts on managing the public image of a 
lackadaisical Kadhi, and masters of pleasant yet efficient crowd control.  
Further bureaucratic issues lie in the record making and storing processes. The court has a 
strange mix of formal record keeping with informal storage. The courts records are basically 
handwritten short hand notes written by the Kadhi, and only legible to the Kadhi, and  typewriter 
style subpoenas and orders. These notes are then placed into file folders that look ten years old 
when they are only a year old. Then files are stored in an almost organized manner, numerical by 
case number and case type, but also randomly stacked under the front counter, in an organization 
system only a few clerks seem to magically know. The records room I had access to was a huge 
jumble of cases from 2008 to the present, the rest are locked up in an archive room a distance 
away from the current Kadhi’s Court locations. To add to the chaos of the frequently illegible 
records, the laid back hegemonic power of the court gave me access to some of the most personal 
information. I sifted through countless files with medical examiner reports after a husband had 
beaten his wife, I had my hands on passport numbers, immigration information, bank statement 
copies, and even emails from the process of courtship between a man, his wife, and his soon to 
be second wife. While I had research permits and permission from the Kadhi, part of me felt that 
I was violating the privacy of many patrons of the Kadhi’s Court. 
 
Funderburk 
SIT Kenya: Swahili Islam 
35 
 
E. Court Costs and Funding 
Many opponents of the Kenyan Kadhis’ courts argue that it is wrong for the courts to be 
funded through the Kenyan government, and that they take funds and resources away from the 
Kenyan High Court. The argument is founded around questions regarding the use of Kenyan tax 
payer money to fund a religious institution that is not used by everyone, but privileges those who 
identify as Muslim. 
I argue that the Kadhis’ courts do the reverse; they actually privilege all Kenyan religious 
sects, because they eliminate 4.3 million people (Kenyan Muslims) from the already 
overstretched secular court system. The Kadhis’ courts do not act as a financial burden because it 
has low overhead to be financed, and Muslim citizens of Kenya are certainly paying more in 
taxes than the minor costs of a Kadhis’ court system with only 17 Kadhis for the entire country. 
Additionally, the court does not necessarily act as a privileged experience that those who are not 
practicing Muslims are robbed of, rather it is often a stressful  experience that Muslims put 
themselves through in order to get legal decisions that keep their personal faith and values in 
mind.  
Those Muslims who use the court are also paying through Court fees, and the various costs 
of affidavits, copies, evidence processing, subpoenas, and other court services. Then many opt 
for legal representation, and then pay additional costs to attorneys, and lastly they lose valuable 
time in which they could be generating income. During the course of my research in the 
Mombasa Kadhi’s Court I quickly realized that many people were not only leaving work to take 
up issues at the court, but traveling domestically and internationally. The costs of travel, missing 
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work, lodging, and basic court and representation fees meant that using the Kadhi to solve 
problems in the realm of family law quickly becomes a complicated and expensive process. 
F. Trans-National Nature of the Court 
One morning, during my first week of research, I noticed a man who seemed to be different 
from the other men attending the Kadhi’s Court. He was clean shaven, well dressed in attire that 
can only be described as business casual. After we failed to meet with the Kadhi in the morning, 
and were both told to return when the court reopened after lunch, this increasingly irritated man, 
“Haldoon,” decided to strike up a conversation with me. Haldoon’s story was the first of many 
that would reveal the trans-national nature of the Mombasa Kadhi’s Court. Haldoon gave up his 
Kenyan citizenship to become a citizen of the United Kingdom, and currently lives in London.  
After the death of his Mother, Haldoon had to travel to Kenya to settle her succession in the 
Mombasa Kadhi’s Court. Haldoon said that his Mom had millions in property that as her only 
son, was his inheritance, but due to his absence had come under attack by another person trying 
to take over his full inheritance. In the process of filing the case with the Kadhi’s Court he had 
packed up his family and pulled his children out of school for what was supposed to be a two 
week visit to Mombasa. Haldoon was a constant feature in the Kadhi’s Court everyday for two 
weeks. At the point that I met Haldoon, he was being fined by his childrens’ school for their 
extended absence, and had lost money on their return plane tickets because they were forced to 
miss their return flights. He had already paid lawyer and court fees, but every time the Kadhi 
assigned a time for him to come to open court, the Kadhi failed to be around or get to the case.  
Haldoon’s frustration prompted a long discussion in which he told me about his view of the 
relationship between money and power in Kenya. He criticized the courts, claiming that poor 
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people seeking the Kadhi will not receive help for weeks, but still have to try everyday, 
diminishing their already meager incomes. He told me that he preferred his life in the United 
Kingdom, where the man with one leg trying to make his way up the stairs would be the first 
priority of the court, as a person with disabilities. Haldoon asked that I write a paper that would 
turn the stone to reveal the problems and corruption with the entire Kenyan Judiciary, but 
particularly the Kadhis’ courts. I think that Haldoon’s unique position as both a local, but a 
citizen of another country enabled him to speak out against what he saw as corruption in the 
Kadhis’ courts, that many people using that courts do not have. So in this sense, some of the 
trans-national cases are not only highlighting the extended authority of the Kadhis throughout the 
globe, but also creating an arena for the Kadhi’s to be openly criticized. After all, once 
Haldoon’s decision was reached he returned to London, and went on with his life with very little 
chance of needing to return to the Kadhi for more legal issues. 
My argument that first began to crystallize through my interview with Haldoon, is that the 
Kadhis courts are not just Kenyan, but rather a legal system that finds itself extending it’s power 
across the world, not just to neighboring communities but even the family law decisions of some 
people in the western world who profess the Muslim faith and have issues where one person 
involved has ties to Kenya. Evidence supporting my argument came in the case of another 
interview with a Somali man, and two case files that involved citizens from other countries, one 
from Germany, and the other from Tanzania. 
The aforementioned Case A was a custody dispute, in which a man was seeking for sole 
guardianship of his child, without filing for or receiving divorce. The man based his argument on 
the premise that his wife was an immigrant, and Tanzanian national. His concern was that his 
wife would take his son and flee across the border to her family in Tanzania. While this case was 
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emotionally trying for me, as I felt unsure about the validity of the man’s claims, it is not an 
uncommon occurrence for “kidnappings” that breach country borders. This case highlights the 
trans-national nature of families, and the Kadhi’s Court recognizing that nature, and switching 
it’s jurisprudence in order to accommodate the way in which national boundaries create separate 
legal jurisdictions.  
Case A resulted in the man being granted custody of his child, without the wife ever being 
present in the Court. There was paperwork filed saying that the woman was notified of the case, 
and that in her absence the case would be decided without her. However, how can the court be 
certain that she was notified of the proceedings, when there is no signature or concrete evidence? 
I mainly questioned these proceedings, because I have difficulty understanding what parent 
would not even show up for court, when their parental authority is being threatened. I do wonder 
if perhaps the court clerk was bribed not to serve the paperwork. Another oddity in the case that I 
found startling, was the while the woman had no contact with the court, and was living apart 
from her husband, the husband had filed paperwork regarding his wife, to prove that the issue 
fell under the jurisdiction of the court. This paperwork included the wife’s Kenyan identification 
card, her birth certificate, Kenyan immigration paperwork including her dependents pass, her 
passport, and the wedding certificate. It is not surprising to see this threat of a trans-national 
family being separated by dancing around the jurisdictional boundaries put in place by 
geographical borders. In Susan Hirsch’s case study of the Malindi Kadhi’s Court, Pronouncing 
and Persevering, she lived in a family that had experienced the father taking two beloved 
grandchildren into Tanzania for over a decade.  
I further found evidence of the transnational nature of families and the Kadhis’ courts in Case 
E, a divorce case between a man and his second wife, a German national. Having access to this 
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case file was fascinating, and I found myself hungrily reading each page of the huge file. The 
plaintiff of the case was a German national woman, who after receiving a scratched out divorce 
notice from a Malindi imam wishing her the best of luck in her future endeavors. She filed for a 
divorce certificate, past maintenance, edda maintenance, and house rent, totaling 16.5 million 
Kenyan shillings in payments from the husband. Through a thick stack of emails between the 
plaintiff, the defendant (her ex husband), and the defendant’s first wife, I was able to trace the 
courtship and decisions leading to the marriage. The Plaintiff and Defendant courted via email 
between Kenya and Germany, after meeting in Kenya, although the Plaintiff returned to 
Germany. When the Defendant proposed to the Plaintiff, and the Defendant’s first wife extended 
her blessings to the second bride, the Plaintiff migrated from Germany to Kenya. One of the past 
maintenance claims the Plaintiff thus made were for the costs of immigration. While the Kadhi 
did not award the Plaintiff 16.5 million Kenyan Shillings in past maintenance, he did reward 2 
million for immigration costs, and 463,000 for Edda and past maintenance. This case highlights 
and underlines the transnational impact of families, and therefore the importance and value of 
family law jurisdiction in the various forms of courts that hold this jurisdiction.  
Lastly, I conducted a second interview that revealed further the transnational nature of the 
Kadhis’ courts. While waiting in the court, I asked a man for the time in Kiswahili, he informed 
me in English that he couldn’t speak Kiswahili, but his wife, who was sitting beside me, could 
speak Kiswahili. Upon further questioning I discovered that the man couldn’t speak Kiswahili, 
because he was not from Coast Province. Rather the man was from London, but originally near 
the Kenya Somali border, with his first language being Somali. The man had traveled from 
London, where he drove one of the famous double decked buses, to marry a Swahili woman. 
This man displayed how the Kadhis’ court is homogenous in religion, features a transnational 
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and trans-cultural authority that impacts the lives of people from different countries, as well as 
different ethnic groups and cultures.    
G. Languages 
One facet of the Mombasa Kadhi’s Court that was simultaneously impressive and a critique 
was the multilingual nature of the court. Through my observation of cases within the Open 
Court, I found the court to be a place that used a plethora of languages. In many ways language 
was a gendered tool, while women speaking with the Kadhi spoke almost inaudible Kiswahili, 
and men tended to speak clear and vocal English with the Kadhi. On the several cases I 
observed, I only heard a man testify in Kiswahili once, and never heard a woman testify in 
English. This gendered dynamic of the court suggests other cultural norms, in which men are 
more active in the public and business sphere, meaning that they are most likely not as confined 
to one dominant language as their female counterparts. I found the comfort of the Kadhi, his 
clerks, and the attorneys switching between Kiswahili and English to be quite impressive. The 
Kadhi also handwrote the court proceedings, in which he would specify what language the 
proceedings were in, but simultaneously listen and translate all Kiswahili into English within the 
case file. However I criticize this use of multiple languages for several reasons. 
The first reason I criticize the movements from one language to another within court 
proceedings is on the basis of fairness and an elimination of bias. Those who testify can be cross 
examined, but when the person testifies in English, and the other party is only comfortable in 
Kiswahili, how will they understand the proceedings they just witnessed? If for example a 
woman who is only comfortable in Kiswahili is filing for divorce, but her husband testifies in 
English, how will she recognize the potential errors, lies, or slander in his testimony? How will 
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that woman be able to defend herself if she is not fully aware of what has been said about her? 
By keeping these gendered and divided standards of language within the court, I felt that the 
court would never be able to be unbiased, or even close to demonstrating a lack of bias.  
The second reason the multi lingual nature of the court is problematic, lies in the courts 
inability to serve Kenyan Muslims who are not efficient in English or Kiswahili. In an interview 
with one of the Kadhis’ Court staff, I questioned about such groups as the Gujarati, and their use 
of the Kadhis’ courts. The staff member told me that the Gujarati are Muslim, but they refrain 
from using the Kadhis’ courts as often as the Swahili. The staff member expressed feelings of 
frustration towards working with the Gujarati, because the Gujarati who do use the court are 
usually only women seeking divorce, and that because of the nature of the Gujarati’s 
confinement of women, there was usually a language barrier. She said that these women were 
confined and typically only learned to be efficient in Hindi, so explaining court processes and 
hearing their cases was exceedingly difficult, as no one within the court spoke Hindi. I think that 
in this case the staff member pitied Gujarati women in many ways, but felt that the court was at a 
loss to adequately serve their needs, despite their falling under the Kadhis’ jurisdiction.  
Lastly, through my interview and observation of the Somali speaking man, and his Somali 
speaking family, I discovered that those who use the court cannot rely on the ease of everyone 
communicating in the same language. That ultimately there is a large assortment of languages in 
which people using the court are proficient at, and that they did not always fall under the same 
languages court staff and authorities are able to use. This prevents fair and balanced judgments, 
as well as equality in access to the court systems, so that many people are alienated from the 
court system, and face oppression even in a legal system that is supposed to be a tool for 
tempering forms of gendered, ethnic, and religious oppression faced by patrons of the court.  
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The Kadhis’ Court is a gendered space for legal dispute in which women are commoditized, 
while simultaneously creating a space for women to make claims for justice. Both my secondary 
literature research surrounding Sharia law, and forst hand research on the traditional 
implementations of Sharia within Kadhis’ courts draw attention to the view of women and men 
as inherently separate, and therefore treated differently.  According to Islamic legal scholar, 
Judith Tucker, “the idea that such net differentiation ran the risk of fostering hostilities, of 
producing social rifts if not outright conflicts along gender lines, lurked between the lines of 
legal discourse. The task of a legal thinker, thus was not only to distinguish the male from the 
female, but also to elaborate on distinctly gendered rights, many of which privilege men, but 
some of which worked to temper male dominance” (Tucker 66). Tucker’s argument in regards to 
the role of legal thinkers is applicable to my research, as I found that many fatwas and Kadhi 
judgments can seem liberal in the area of women’s rights, but in actuality they are applied as a 
tool for protecting a system of patriarchy and inequality. Evidence can be seen through divorce 
cases, in which women seek and receive divorce, because men who desire divorce do not need 
the Kadhi or permission from a man to receive a divorce. Further evidence of this was seen in 
Case H, in which the appearance on the surface is one that favored a woman, after the Kadhi 
granted her custody of her children. However when you dive deeper into the case file, it is 
apparent that the decision was made not because of the woman’s testimony of violence and 
abuse at the hands of her husband, but rather because she had a son of 18 years who as a man 
testified and corroborated his mother’s story.  
My research also evidenced the commoditization of women. Case I was the custody case 
over a ten year old daughter. The defendant was a woman who was divorced while she was 
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pregnant, and forced to move to Saudi Arabia for temporary work when the child was young. For 
the duration of the woman’s work contract, approximately two years, the child lived with the 
maternal grandmother. Throughout the child’s life, the father was absent, although occasionally 
taking the child to the hospital when sick, and paying school fees when harassed by the 
grandmother. At the time of the case, the daughter was 9 years old. Despite the defendant, her 
mother, and the daughter’s testimonies that clearly emphasized the child’s home was with her 
mother, the father was granted full custody once the child reached puberty, around 
approximately 12 years of age. Additionally, evidence and testimonies corroborated that the 
mother was more financially capable of caring for the child, with a larger home and no additional 
children, while the father’s home was only two bedrooms with his wife and their three children. 
In this case the daughter is being commoditized because her best interests are being 
configured through a larger patriarchal system. In this system of local interpretations of Sharia, 
the mother is confined to the domestic space within the child’s life, so that in order to create a 
stable future the child needs the father to navigate the public arena. So neither daughter nor 
mother are able to define their lives independently or outside of the patriarchal structure in which 
they exist. A woman’s value thus lies in her relationship to men, with no independent agency 
outside of the relationship and role to men. The Kadhis’ courts thus perpetuate this system of 
gender division and differentiation. The Kadhi’s judgment of this case is as follows: 
“The general rule is that in the event of disagreement between parties on custody the best 
interests of the child takes priority. Priority is generally given to the mother for custody of a 
child till he/she reaches maturity/adolescence unless the mother remarries.  
It is reputed that a lady complained to the holy prophet (pbuh) that his divorcee (husband) 
wanted to take away their child, the prophet ruled in her favor to get custody as long as she is 
not remarried. Abubakar (12.7) the second (calipha ruled) otherwise in the care of Um Asim 
vs Umar bin calipha in the matter of the custody of Asin bin Umar bin Khatib. 
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The law gives priority on custody to the mother till she remarries. It also gives the child a 
right to choose between his/her parents when she/he reaches adolescence. Before adolescence 
the girl child is best suited to live with her mother as she needs to be taught a lot about 
growing up cleanliness, menstruation, etc. and the best suited is the mother. A balance has to 
be struck between the two principles… custody of child granted to defendant for 2 years until 
the child reaches puberty (menstruation). Thereafter custody shall revert to the plaintiff as 
father as a matter of right (ex desito justiciae). During the period plaintiff is entitle to visit 
and pay child maintenance… Right to appeal within 30 days.” 
It is also important to note that the decision was appealed in the High Court, and the typed 
court records that were sent to the High Court are the reason why I was able to fully read the 
Kadhi’s judgment and not merely the order. Unfortunately the appellate notice does not show 
which party filed the appeal, and there is no information in the Kadhi’s Court regarding the 
outcome of the appeal.  
My research of Case G also demonstrated the gendered inequality of the court when the 
plaintiff filed for divorce against her husband.  Included in the plaintiff’s heartbreaking 
testimony of prolonged physical, mental, and verbal abuse from the defendant and his mother, 
there were also copies of Kenyan police reports, including a medical examiners report of the 
extent of physical abuse apparent on the Plaintiff after one incident. The medical examiners 
report stated that the Plaintiff had suffered heavy blows with a blunt object, and that she had a 
history of abuse. There was marked bruising and tenderness across her body. Despite the obvious 
misconduct of the husband, he was granted custody of their children, and ordered to pay the 
Plaintiff 16,000 shillings in maintenance. After failing to pay the maintenance the Kadhi issued a 
warrant for his arrest, but did not revoke custody of the children. The idea that someone can be 
evidenced as abusive and violent, yet is still considered the best option for child custody is 
astonishing, and clear evidence of a complicated and gendered legal process within the Kadhis’ 
courts.  
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On a more positive note, I am not completely critical of the Kadhis’ courts gender policies 
and behaviors. The Kadhis’ courts application of Sharia law legitimizes polygamy in the legal 
arena, where polygamy under Secular law remains illegal. In this way women who are in 
polygamous unions lack protection through Secular law, and the Kadhis’ courts are the only 
court system that provides some protection for these women. In Case E I witnessed a more 
positive side to polygamy within the Kadhis’ courts. The case surrounded the divorce of a second 
wife, in which she was able to get some maintenance (although meager in size) from her ex 
husband. Included in the evidence were emails between the second wife (before the marriage), 
the husband, and his first wife. One email in particular highlighted a lesser seen side of 
polygamous unions in which the first wife wrote to the soon to be second wife “I am a Muslim 
woman and my husband has the right to marry 4 women if he can. Maybe if it was don’t you that 
he found he could have found some stupid woman. I do not like but I like you so do not feel 
worried or ashamed, come to me happily…” I felt that this quote taken from the evidence was a 
very insightful remark on the existence of polygamy in Muslim Kenyan families, that shows not 
only the more positive side of the relationship, but also that women find themselves as having 
voices that are easy to pretend do not exist.  
I. Legal Pluralism and Conclusion 
The inclusion of the Kadhis courts as well as provisions for customary legal systems has 
created a legally pluralist society throughout Kenya. Anthropologist Sally Engle Merry defines 
legal pluralism as a situation in which two or more laws or legal systems coexist within a given 
social field. Kenyan legal pluralism is not limited to the existence of Religious law and Secular 
law, but is accompanied by various forms of Customary law practiced differently within the 
multitudes of Kenyan ethnic groups. With respect to the Kadhis’ courts the legally pluralistic 
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nature of society allows Muslims to participate in a matter of forum shopping separate systems 
of law in issues of Family/Personal law; which has a number of disadvantages as well as 
advantages.  
Kenyan legal pluralism contains some serious disadvantages.  One disadvantage is the 
impossibility of defining where the boundaries of law are if everything can be appealed in a 
different legal arena. Part of the function of law is social regulation, which isn’t totally possible 
when there are coexisting different legal systems. Further, fetishizing forum shopping helps to 
cover the faults within the different legal systems. More legal systems in this case are not 
necessarily better. One arena where this is most apparent is the gendered definitions of rights. 
Men and women’s rights are often defined differently in order to rid of preserve systems of 
oppression. However, rights are further divided when legal pluralism causes various different 
definitions of gendered rights, so that you see a situation in which not only are men and women 
different, but divisions erupt between different women or different men.  
 Specifically with respect to the Kadhis’ courts, there is a question of whose interpretations of 
Sharia and Islam are being applied within the space of the courtroom. As numerous scholars 
have highlighted, what is called Sharia, or Islamic law, is a historic product of debates between 
Muslims across space and time. Within Sharia there is room for disagreement and critique, but 
its application in the courtroom can pave over these disagreements with a sweeping and 
particularistic interpretations. Often times these interpretations, as has been displayed in my case 
discussions serve to perpetuate a patriarchal and elite dominated system. 
As my research has shown, forum shopping has its limits, and the Kadhis’ courts are beset by 
a variety of problems. These problems include the aforementioned critiques in gender, language, 
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bureaucratic, transnational, cost, power structure, constitutional, and jurisdictional spheres. 
Those who use the forum of the Kadhis’ courts are working within a specific set of limitations. 
Forum shopping is also a current point of contention among many contemporary Kenyan 
Christians, who find the Kadhis’ courts to be exclusionary, and a way of navigating around the 
Christian Marriage Act’s statutes.  
At the same time, I found Kenya’s system of legal pluralism to be an advantage in the 
independence that is created by the opportunity to forum shop for the best-case scenario in legal 
decisions. Kenyan Muslims often have the choice between three forums, Secular, Customary, or 
Religious law, which helps them choose the legal principles to live by. A number of interviewees 
highlighted the advantage of having multiple legal forums to address their problems, like the 
Gujarati’s existence between Secular courts and Kadhis’ courts, depending on the issue within 
Family/Personal law. The second advantage is the greater freedom to participate as a Kenyan and 
a Muslim within contemporary society. This is established by not being fully isolated into one 
legal forum, nor being forced to accept the hegemony of a Judeo-Christian inspired legal system.  
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VIII. Recommendations for Avenues for Further Research 
For those interested in topics surrounding legal pluralism, Religious law, and Family/ 
Personal law, I compiled a list of areas I would have liked to have extended my own research 
to.  
One of the fascinating aspects of the Kadhis’ courts, is their dependence and connection 
to the Kenyan High Court. It would be interesting to track this relationship through the 
Kadhis’ courts appeals process, which is filed in the High Court, and decided by a High 
Court judge, in accordance with the advice and opinion of a second Kadhi. I feel that tracking 
the process of appeals would be integral to fully understanding Kenyan legal pluralism, as 
well as a fascinating insight on the application of Religious law in a Secular court. It would 
also be interesting to do a survey of different Kenyan Kadhis’ courts, and how the Kadhi’s 
court of the Lamu archipelago differs from the Mombasa Kadhi’s Court, as they each 
respectively have one Kadhi, but are vastly different in the amount of cases they hear.  
Second, I recommend research on the history of Kadhis’ courts throughout East Africa, 
and a comparative look at the Tanzanian approach to Kadhis’ courts. Post-colonial Tanzania 
forbade the use and establishment of Kadhis’ courts in their constitution, and the 
development of their Secular legal system has had to universally apply the same body of 
family laws throughout the country. This is a vastly different approach than Kenya, and it 
would be interesting to compare how this approach was implemented, and what the various 
results of the approach is. Also it would be interesting to understand Tanzanian family law 
versus Kenyan in terms of dowry, divorce, and polygamous unions, in terms of what falls 
under Tanzanian legal jurisdiction.   
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Case Appendix:  
 
Civil Case “A” 93/2010 
“AMF” v. “TL”  
Dispute involving custody and guardianship of the child 
 
Civil Case “B” (open court case)  
“FSM” v. “RSM” 
Dispute involving attempt to travel outside Kenya 
 
Civil Case “C” (open court case)  
“SAD” v. “RSM” 
Plaintiff seeking custody and guardianship of child 
 
Civil Case “D” 267/2008 
“LSM” v. “DSM” 
Succession and inheritance claim involving property filed after the Respondent’s death in 2008.  
 
Civil Case “E” 136/2009 
“GW” v. “SC” 
Alimony and maintenance payments involving a polygamous household, case with transnational 
dimensions as the appellant was a German national moving the Kadhi’s court for divorce and 
maintenance payments. 
 
Civil Case “F” (open court case)  
“SM” v. “SW” 
Case involving divorce and custody claims 
 
Civil Case “G” 369/2009 
“NK” v. “KA”  
Appellant seeking divorce and custody of the child, divorce awarded to appellant, while custody 
awarded to respondent in spite of overwhelming evidence of domestic abuse and assault 
corroborated by police and medical reports.   
 
Civil Case “H” 135/2009 
“SF” v. “SM” 
Dispute involving divorce and custody of children, one minor and one deemed of majority age 
by the court.  
 
Civil Case “I” 271/2009 
“OSF” v. “YSM” 
Dispute involving custody of child with court attempting to balance best interests of the child 
with the claims of the appellant and the respondent. Case appealed to the High Court Ref: 
HCCIA 116/2010. Details of appeal process and summary judgment included in case file.  
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